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THE CONSISTENCY OF CONSERVATIVE TAX 
POLICY 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser 
ABSTRACT—Conservative tax arguments have been remarkably consistent 
in substance, style, and method for almost a century. Substantively, their 
tax policy consists of three claims: (1) an economic one that low taxes 
encourage economic growth and prosperity for all, (2) a legal–
constitutional one that excessive federal spending and heavy taxes 
unbalance our federal form of government at best, and at worst 
unconstitutionally violate state rights, and (3) a patriotic claim that high 
tax-and-spend policies are un-American. This third, patriotic, claim is a 
major factor in conservatives’ remarkable success in selling their policy to 
the public and in the current political stalemate about taxation. The 
emotional aspect of patriotism inhibits rational discussion and limits the 
range of politically feasible solutions. This Article suggests that if 
conservatives would focus on their two substantive points, they would help 
create an atmosphere more conducive to the thoughtful tax discussion the 
country requires. 
The Article illustrates conservatives’ consistency with an examination 
of the linked battles concerning income tax reduction and a veterans’ bonus 
that occurred between 1924 and 1936. This period had much in common 
with the present, including (1) the growth of government, (2) increased 
knowledge about human behavior, (3) the development of new mass media, 
(4) the use of the new media by organizations to disseminate their 
viewpoints to the public, (5) increased lobbying (at least partially due to the 
other factors), and (6) mounting concern that the lobbying was distorting 
the political process. Commentators, then and now, have noted that some 
organizations purporting to be broad-based civic groups providing neutral 
information are really vehicles through which small—sometimes 
wealthy—groups try to shape public opinion and thereby pressure Congress 
to adopt their self-interested viewpoint. This Article focuses on two 
groups—the National Economy League, a group active in the 1930s, and, 
to a lesser degree, the Citizens’ National Committee in the 1920s. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although liberals and conservatives in the United States generally 
disagree about tax issues, they tend to be unanimous in their belief that 
federal taxation today is in an alarming state of disarray. Moreover, few (if 
any) see a quick or easy path out of the morass that now passes for tax 
policy. While both liberals and conservatives share the blame for the 
current situation, conservatives bear the heavier responsibility for the 
political stalemate because they have been more successful at articulating 
and selling their tax policy to the public. Their policy rests on three claims, 
which they have been asserting and disseminating with remarkable 
consistency for decades. 
The first claim is an economic one. Low taxes—especially for the 
wealthy—encourage investment, which leads to economic growth and 
prosperity for all.1 High taxes, in contrast, hamper economic growth by 
facilitating excessive and wasteful government spending. Although some 
people disagree with this conclusion about the results of high taxes, the 
claim does make an important connection between taxing and spending—a 
link that liberals often ignore. 
The second claim is a legal and even a constitutional one. Excessive 
federal spending—fueled by heavy taxation—unbalances America’s 
federalist form of government by creating too strong a central government.2 
Indeed, such spending, they argue, is often unconstitutional because it 
exceeds the limited powers granted to the federal government and infringes 
upon states’ rights. 
The legal–constitutional argument blends into conservatives’ third 
claim, which, simply put, asserts that high tax-and-spend policies are  
 
1 For a discussion of this claim, see THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, 
TAXES AND THE ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945 (2012); Eric 
Kroh, CRS Faces Allegations of Bias, 137 TAX NOTES 714 (2012); Rudy Takala & Salim Furth, 
Scholars Agree: High Tax Rates Do Harm Growth, FOUNDRY (Jan. 27, 2013, 9:27 AM), 
http://blog.heritage.org/2013/01/27/scholars-agree-high-tax-rates-do-harm-growth/; William McBride, 
What Is the Evidence on Taxes and Growth?, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2012), http://taxfoundation.org/
article/what-evidence-taxes-and-growth. 
2 For a modern statement of this belief, see REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, WE BELIEVE IN 
AMERICA: 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 10–11, 21–22 (2012), http://www.gop.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf, which discusses “Federalism and The Tenth Amendment” and 
“Reforming Government to Serve the People.” 
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un-American. This patriotic tax appeal bears the heaviest responsibility for 
the tax morass for several reasons. First, American history and myth create 
a natural sympathy in many Americans for small federal government and 
low taxation. Second, patriotism’s emotional appeal gains traction more 
easily with the public than rationally based appeals to theoretical ideas of 
distributive justice. Its effectiveness increases even more because 
conservatives have employed sophisticated emotional appeals to 
disseminate their tax position to the public. For decades they have used the 
most modern techniques of persuasion and the most modern mass media to 
sway public opinion. Conservatives’ successful marriage of patriotism’s 
emotionality to the “objectivity” of low taxation, however, raises a barrier 
to rational discussions about tax policy and limits the range of politically 
feasible solutions. Consequently, this argument bears the heaviest 
responsibility for the current tax morass. 
The recent fight about the Affordable Care Act3 illustrates the obstacle 
that conservatives’ patriotic tax approach presents to rational debates. For 
example, many opponents assailed the Act as un-American—even 
socialistic—government spending and taxation, but at the same time 
opposed cuts in other government-run programs such as Medicare or Social 
Security.4 Similarly, some people express outrage at the long delays 
veterans now face in obtaining promised benefits, and many note the role 
bureaucratic errors play in those delays; fewer note how increased 
funding—paid with tax dollars—could speed the transition to electronic 
databases, decrease errors, and facilitate faster benefits.5 
Veterans’ benefits and their relation to taxation was also a huge issue 
in the 1920s and 1930s6—a time in which conservatives used the same 
 
3 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
4 See, e.g., Cruz Presses Ahead with Defunding ObamaCare, Says It Will Take a ‘Tsunami’ of 
Support, FOX NEWS (Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/08/25/cruz-press-ahead-
with-defunding-obamacare-but-says-it-will-take-national/; Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol & John 
Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 25, 26 (2011). 
Former South Carolina Senator and Heritage Foundation president Jim DeMint said that week: 
“I cannot think of anything that’s more un-American than national government-run health care . . . . 
Those who believe in those principles of socialism and collectivism we’ve seen over the centuries, they 
see as their holy grail taking control of the health care system.” Igor Volsky, Jim DeMint: Providing 
Health Care for Seniors and Veterans is ‘Un-American’ and Grounded in ‘Socialism,’ THINKPROGRESS 
(Aug. 30, 2013, 8:55 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/08/30/2555561/jim-demint-programs-
like-medicare-veterans-health-care-american-grounded-socialism/. See also Jackie Calmes, Delicate 
Pivot as G.O.P. Blasts Rivals on Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, at A9 (discussing Republican 
criticisms of Medicare cuts). 
5 E.g., Aaron Glantz, Number of Veterans Who Die Waiting for Benefits Claims Skyrockets, DAILY 
BEAST (Dec. 20, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/20/number-of-vet
erans-who-die-waiting-for-benefits-claims-skyrockets.html; Randi Kaye & Scott Bronstein, Hundreds 
of Thousands of War Vets Still Waiting for Health Benefits, CNN (Oct. 29, 2012, 10:04 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/29/health/delayed-veterans-benefits. 
6 See discussion infra Parts I & II. 
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arguments they use today about taxing and spending. Immediately after 
World War I, pressure began building to both cut income taxes and to pay 
veterans “adjusted” compensation (popularly, the “soldiers’ bonus”)—a 
practice dating to the Revolutionary War. Both party platforms for the 1920 
presidential election called for tax reform and supported aiding disabled 
veterans.7 Neither, however, mentioned a bonus for the able-bodied, which 
was a politically contested issue. Although many Democrats, such as 
former presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan, argued that a war 
profits tax could fund a general bonus, the Democratic platform stated that 
veterans’ patriotism and “heroic conduct . . . constitute a sacred heritage of 
posterity, the worth of which can never be recompensed from the Treasury 
and the glory of which must not be diminished by any such expedients.”8 
Although the Republican platform was also silent on the issue, presidential 
candidate Warren Harding hinted he might favor a general bonus.9 As 
president, however, he vigorously opposed it, stating that tax reduction was 
the top priority, and a bonus would prevent that.10 In 1921, he and Secretary 
of the Treasury Andrew Mellon succeeded in getting Congress to table the 
bonus bill and enact tax reductions—although not large enough to satisfy 
him or Mellon.11 In March 1922, Harding vetoed a bonus bill on both 
financial and patriotic grounds, stating that tax reduction would make 
America “a better country for which to fight, or to have fought, and affords 
a surer abiding place in which to live and attain.”12 
Although the American Legion promptly announced it would continue 
fighting for a general soldiers’ compensation, other veterans organized to 
oppose a bonus for able-bodied veterans.13 Groups such as the Ex-Service 
Men’s Anti-Bonus League contended that a general bonus would be an 
“unjust burden of taxation.”14 Moreover, the League stressed the un-
American nature of such a bonus. Others, including the 1920 Democratic 
platform, had opposed a bonus on the grounds that it might “diminish[]” 
 
7 See PAUL DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN AMERICAN EPIC 25 (2006). See 
also the party platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1920, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 8, 1820), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29635; Democratic Party Platform of 1920, AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 28, 1920), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29592 
[hereinafter Democratic Party Platform]. For a contemporary history of the bonus in 1924, see, for 
example, 65 CONG. REC. 10761–63 (June 5, 1924) (statement of Rep. Fish (R-NY)). 
8 Democratic Party Platform, supra note 7. 
9 DICKSON & ALLEN, supra note 7, at 25–26. 
10 Id. at 26. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. at 26–27; “Bad Finance, Not Patriotic”; Bonus Vetoed, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 20, 1922, 
at 1. For a recent discussion of the bonus and taxation, see Anne L. Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, 
and Income Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924 Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon 
Plan, 59 TAX L. REV. 373 (2006). 
13 See Legion Deadlocked on Bonus Question, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1923, at 3. 
14 Veterans Organize Anti-Bonus League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1922, at 9. 
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the “glory” of the veterans’ sacrifice.15 The League, however, went much 
further: the “material reward” of a bonus was “repugnant to the spirit of 
true patriotism and a violation of the fundamental principles of American 
citizenship.”16 
After Harding’s death in August 1923, President Calvin Coolidge 
continued to press for tax reductions instead of a bonus.17 Nevertheless, in 
June 1924, Congress passed both; the latter over Coolidge’s veto.18 Neither 
side was satisfied. Those who wanted the tax reduction believed the rates 
needed to decline further. Bonus supporters demanded immediate payment 
rather than the deferred ones promised under the 1924 Act. The linkage 
between a soldier’s bonus and taxation continued until 1936 when the 
bonus issue was finally resolved. 
Although the issues crossed party lines, mainstream Republicans 
tended to oppose the bonus more frequently than Democrats. For example, 
progressive-leaning Republicans, such as Representative James Frear  
(R-WI) and presidential hopeful Senator Hiram Johnson (R-CA), favored it 
in the 1920s.19 Some Democrats opposed it, including President Roosevelt, 
who after a prolonged silence on the issue vetoed a bonus compensation act 
in the 1930s.20 Although both parties favored income tax reduction in the 
1920s, big differences between the parties existed—ones that are familiar 
to Americans today: how much of a reduction and which class of taxpayers 
would get the bigger cuts. In general, Republicans (other than the 
progressive or “radical” ones) favored the Mellon Plan, which dramatically 
slashed rates on the wealthiest taxpayers. Democrats, on the other hand, 
generally favored reducing taxes more for lower income taxpayers than 
wealthy ones.21 (Even “low” income taxpayers, it must be noted, were 
relatively well off because fewer than 10% of Americans paid income 
tax.)22 
Generalizing again, those favoring the Mellon Plan in the 1920s were 
against the bonus. For conservatives, the two issues were two sides of the 
same coin: the bonus would cost so much that tax reduction would not be 
possible for years. In the 1930s, conservative groups such as the National 
Economy League not only opposed the bonus but also other New Deal 
 
15 Democratic Party Platform, supra note 7. 
16 Legion Deadlocked on Bonus Question, supra note 13. 
17 See infra Part I. 
18 See infra notes 107–09. 
19 See, e.g., Parke Brown, “Mirage,” Hiram Cries at Mellon Tax Cut Plans, CHI. DAILY TRIB., 
Jan. 19, 1924, at 5. 
20 H.R. DOC. NO. 74-197, at 1 (1935). 
21 See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2585 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Blanton); 65 CONG. REC. 2587 
(Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Garner). 
22 See, e.g., MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 
1933–1939, at 4, 70 (1984). 
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taxing and spending programs.23 Pro-bonus Democrats and progressive 
Republicans, on the other hand, tended to ignore the bonus’s cost, think the 
cost was overblown, or believe new taxes could pay for it. In 1924, for 
example, Representative Frear (R-WI) claimed there could be both a bonus 
and a tax cut for every taxpayer if state and local securities were taxed, a 
“moderate” excess-profits tax and an undistributed profits tax existed, 
inheritance tax were increased, and a gift tax were enacted. Also, he 
believed publicizing tax records would increase tax collections.24 
The long anti-bonus/pro-tax reduction battle illustrates the consistency 
of conservative tax policy and the marketing of that policy. This Article’s 
focus on two intense portions of that campaign illuminates the policy’s 
strength (the connection between taxing and spending) and its weakness 
(nonrational appeals to patriotism). It begins with the 1923–1924 
presidential campaign and proceeds to describe the National Economy 
League campaign in the 1930s. Within these two campaigns, the Article 
concentrates on the key emotion-based patriotic aspect of the conservative 
position. Due to space limitations, it does not explore the rich theoretical 
and empirical evidence that explains how cognitive biases and emotion-
based, often unconscious, concepts—such as framing, schema, and 
worldviews—bypass and/or influence rational thought. Rather, it 
concentrates on describing the methods conservatives used to link 
patriotism to their tax policy. One hundred years of such linkage, layered 
on top of a mythic strain of anti-tax sentiment dating back to the foundation 
of the nation, have contributed to today’s heated but deeply unproductive 
tax debates. 
I. 1923–1924 TAX REDUCTION/ANTI-BONUS CAMPAIGN 
In November 1923, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon opened 
his campaign to further reduce taxes beyond what had been achieved in the 
Revenue Act of 1921 with a letter to House Ways and Means Chairman 
William R. Green (R-IA).25 In the letter, sent while Congress was recessed, 
Mellon explicitly linked tax reduction and the bonus. The bonus, he said, 
would postpone tax reduction for many years.26 Moreover, “[i]t would 
mean an increase rather than a decrease in taxes, for in the long run it could 
be paid only out of moneys collected.”27 Congress had to choose between 
tax reductions and a soldiers’ bonus; there could not be both. 
The twinned pro-tax reduction/anti-bonus campaigns appeared 
everywhere, in all types of media: in-the-flesh speeches, radio talks, 
 
23 See infra Part II. 
24 65 CONG. REC. 647–48 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear). 
25 H.R. DOC. NO. 68-63, at 11 (1924). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
108:825 (2014) Conservative Tax Policy 
831 
newspaper and magazine articles, and even “flash” promotions on movie 
screens. From the beginning, these campaigns urged adoption of the 
Mellon Plan without any changes, as if, opponents charged, it were the only 
way tax reform could occur. Mellon Plan supporters also promoted a letter-
writing campaign, urging the public to write or telegram their congressmen, 
demanding they support the Plan and oppose the bonus.28 
Mellon and his supporters alleged that their tax reduction plan was 
“scientific” and economically efficient, in contrast to the plans offered by 
Representatives Frear and Garner. Mellon Plan opponents, however, 
countered that Mellon’s plan was no more scientific than any other plan. 
They supplied several pieces of evidence of the political nature of Mellon’s 
plan. One was the timing of the letter. Sent while Congress was recessed, 
Congress would not even get a copy of the bill until almost a month later. 
Representative Frear alleged that the political nature was self-evident 
because Mellon himself would greatly benefit from his plan.29 Others, such 
as Senator Royal Copeland (D-NY), said the linkage of tax reduction to a 
denial of a veterans’ bonus revealed the political motivation of the plan and 
“did much finally to discredit the claim for the Mellon plan that it was a 
‘scientific’ bill, for the two proposals are essentially independent, although, 
of course, the passage of any law contemplating additional expenditures 
increases the cost of government.”30 In other words, although conservatives 
clearly connected taxing and spending—something liberals often failed to 
do—then as now, they were making that connection only for certain 
spending programs. 
The pro-reduction/anti-bonus campaign occurred on multiple levels. 
Mellon, for example, not only provided Congress with information, but 
also promoted his plan, even publishing a book aimed at the general public, 
Taxation: The People’s Business.31 The Treasury also promoted the Plan in 
testimony and articles.32 Additionally, Under Secretary of the Treasury 
Garrard Winston secretly collaborated with J.A. Arnold—a lobbyist with a 
shady reputation—who operated through allegedly nonpartisan interest 
groups he managed: the American Taxpayers’ League (formerly the 
American Bankers League) and the National Council of State 
Legislatures.33 
 
28 See infra note 57. 
29 65 CONG. REC. 2509 (Feb. 15, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear). 
30 65 CONG. REC. 10626 (June 5, 1924) (statement of Sen. Copeland). 
31 ANDREW W. MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS (1924). See also Andrew William 
Mellon, The Business of Taxation, 2 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG. 105 (1924). 
32 See, e.g., Hon. Garrard B. Winston, Principles Involved in Income Tax Reduction, 2 NAT’L 
INCOME TAX MAG. 69 (1924). 
33 ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS TO UNTAX 
THE ONE PERCENT 45–53, 59–61 (2013); M. Susan Murnane, Selling Scientific Taxation: The Treasury 
Department’s Campaign for Tax Reform in the 1920s, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 819, 843–44, 851 
(2004). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
832 
James Couzens, the progressive Republican Senator from Michigan, 
among others, asserted that Mellon and the Treasury did not just provide 
information, but spread propaganda: “More dishonest statements, 
misstatements if not absolute falsehoods, have been handed out at the 
Treasury Department of the United States for the purpose of misleading the 
public than ever were issued by a public department in my recollection of 
government.”34 Representative John Jones (D-TX) called Mellon “a 
magician in figures as well as in finance” who conveniently misstated 
figures.35 Senator Thaddeus Caraway (D-AR) went so far as to allege that 
Mellon was linked to the anti-bonus propaganda through contributions to 
the Anti-Bonus League by officials of companies that Mellon had interests 
in—a link Mellon denied.36 
Even President Coolidge linked tax reduction to the bonus. In a 
Lincoln Day Speech, his first post-election, nonofficial speech aimed at the 
entire country, Coolidge asserted that the Mellon Plan coupled with a 
rejection of the soldiers’ bonus would keep the nation prosperous.37 
Furthermore, he stated that although providing compensation to injured 
soldiers was appropriate, paying it to healthy veterans was morally 
reprehensible since they had not served for monetary gain.38 Coolidge 
insisted, “[T]he people must understand this is their fight. They alone can 
win it. Unless they made their wishes known to the Congress without 
regard to party this bill will not pass. I urge them to renewed efforts [to 
write Congress].”39 An estimated five million people listened to Coolidge’s 
speech on a radio network so new that the papers found it newsworthy 
enough to note, “[A]tmospheric conditions were splendid for 
broadcasting . . . .”40 
Business interests, which sponsored most of the pro-Mellon/anti-bonus 
literature, began campaigning immediately after Mellon’s letter, and 
without even seeing his Plan.41 The campaigns flooded the press—
especially in big city papers and popular journals like the Literary Digest 
and the Saturday Evening Post.42 The United States Chambers of 
 
34 65 CONG. REC. 1203 (Jan. 21, 1924) (statement of Sen. Couzens); see 65 CONG. REC. 3332 
(Feb. 29, 1924) (statement of Rep. Crosser (D-OH)). 
35 65 CONG. REC. 643–44 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jones). 
36 65 CONG. REC. 3684–86 (Mar. 6, 1924); Mellon Vigorously Denies He Assisted Anti-Bonus 
League, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 6, 1924, at 11. See infra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
37 See Will Permit No Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1924, at 1. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 5,000,000 Hear Speech of Coolidge by Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1924, at 2. 
41 E.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2590 (Feb. 16, 1924) (Rep. Tague (D-Mass.)); Mellon Program Boon to 
Industry, Financiers Assert, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1923, at 1. 
42 See 65 CONG. REC. 10762–63 (June 5, 1924) (statement of Rep. Fish); 65 CONG. REC. 744 
(Jan. 9, 1924) (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (referencing the Saturday Evening Post); 65 CONG. REC. 644 
(Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jones (D-TX)) (referencing the New York Herald, the New York 
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Commerce had long been advocating against a bonus, in large measure 
because it would necessitate increased taxation.43 Mellon’s letter spurred 
many chambers of commerce and trade organizations to launch new, 
ambitious campaigns promoting the Mellon Plan.44 
Like Mellon, Coolidge, and others, the campaigns by these 
organizations made economic and moral arguments. Paying a bonus to 
healthy veterans, they claimed, would not only be so costly as to prevent 
tax reduction and hinder economic prosperity, but also insult the “self-
respect and memory of the American soldiers who served not for money 
but for love of their country.”45 
Ostensibly nonbusiness groups, such as the Ex-Service Men’s Anti-
Bonus League, also reinvigorated their anti-bonus campaigns. The League 
was organized in September 1922 by several prominent veterans such as 
Elihu Root Jr., a founding partner in what became the Dewey Ballantine 
law firm,46 “to combat, as a matter of principle, all propaganda and 
attempted legislation to bonus or pension”47 service men who were not 
injured at war.48 Following Mellon’s letter, however, the League rapidly 
expanded its membership and its activities.49 While favoring all necessary 
support for disabled veterans, it opposed a general bonus for able-bodied 
ones on the now-familiar dual economic and moral grounds.50 Such a bonus 
would increase taxation and demean soldiers’ sacrifices for their country.51 
It would “obliterate” their “splendid” service, reducing it “to the level of 
the service rendered by the man who digs a ditch for a wage.”52 
There were, of course, some Democrats (typically more conservative 
ones) who also objected to a general bonus on patriotic grounds. Senator 
William Bruce (D-MD) for example, warned that pro-bonus soldiers ran 
the risk of turning their patriotism into selfish class behavior.53 Generally, 
 
World, and the New York Times); 65 CONG. REC. 645, 649 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear) 
(referencing Philadelphia papers and “[m]etropolitan papers”); see also Murnane, supra note 33, at 836 
(Post had at least one pro-Mellon article a month in 1924). 
43 E.g., Calls for Support in Fighting Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1922, at 3; Commerce Chamber 
Opposes Cash Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1921, at 1. 
44 E.g., Plans Nation-Wide Fight for Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1923, at 2 (New York 
Chamber of Commerce); Starts National Drive for Mellon Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1923, at 4 
(Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce). 
45 Birmingham for Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1923, at 4. See Barnes Assails Bonus in Cash to 
Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1923, at 8; Starts National Drive for Mellon Tax Plan, supra note 44. 
46 Elihu Root Jr., Lawyer, Is Dead; Statesman’s Son a Civic Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1967, 
at 31. 
47 Veterans Organize Anti-Bonus League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1922, at 9. 
48 Id.; Ex-service Men Fight Bonus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1922, at 9. 
49 Reports Activities in Anti-bonus Move, BALT. SUN, Jan. 2, 1924, at 5. 
50 Veterans Organize Anti-Bonus League, supra note 47. 
51 Id. 
52 Reports Activities in Anti-bonus Move, supra note 49. 
53 See 65 CONG. REC. 2741–44 (Feb. 19, 1924) (statement of Sen. Bruce). 
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however, it was conservative Republicans and businessmen who raised the 
anti-patriotic claim. Sometimes, the charges were more serious. A letter to 
the Editor from the president of the Anti-Bonus League said bonus 
supporters were not really in favor of the bonus, but engaged in an “anti-
capitalistic crusade.”54 
Complaints against pro-Mellon reduction/anti-bonus supporters began 
as quickly as their campaign. Some critics even called it the largest 
propaganda campaign in the country’s history.55 Even some Republicans 
criticized it. Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY) noted that the campaign 
was built on the slogan “Bonus or tax reduction—which?”56 As a result of 
businesses spending millions of dollars, congressmen received thousands of 
letters, telegrams, and petitions demanding that congressmen support the 
Mellon Plan and reject the bonus bill. On January 7, Representative James 
Frear (R-WI) declared Congress was “deluged” by letters from business 
interests supporting a Mellon bill that none of the writers had seen; the 
Ways and Means Committee, he said, was getting at least 300 letters daily 
“written at the instigation of leagues, boards, and clubs” who, in turn, were 
probably prompted by NYC-area bankers.57 Moreover, he stated, every 
congressman who refused to support the Mellon Bill—a bill that would 
preclude a bonus bill—had been threatened with opposition at the next 
election.58 
Some banks and corporations took out pro-reduction/anti-bonus ads in 
the newspapers; some urged readers, customers, and employees to send 
pro-reduction/anti-bonus letters. A large musical instrument company in 
New York City won the “blue ribbon” for “brazen effrontery,” according to 
Representative Lamar Jeffers (D-AL).59 The company sent a memo to 
employees requesting that they write their senators and representatives 
because it was “of the utmost importance and a matter of vital interest to all 
of us” to pass the Mellon plan and reject the bonus bill.60 It instructed 
employees to give their letters to the company’s executive office, which 
would forward them to the Evening Mail.61 The newspaper would fill in the 
names of their congressional delegates. The company ended its memo 
saying: “We shall check up [sic] our pay roll within the next couple of 
weeks to find out those who have written and those who have not.”62 
 
54 Letter to the Editor, Red Fringe of the Bonus Agitation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1924, at 14. 
55 See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 742 (Jan. 9, 1924) (statement of Sen. Simmons); 65 CONG. REC. 939 
(Jan. 14, 1924) (statement of Sen. Harrison). 
56 65 CONG. REC. 10763 (June 5, 1924) (statement of Rep. Fish). 
57 65 CONG. REC. 645 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear). 
58 See id. 
59 65 CONG. REC. 2611 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jeffers). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.; 65 CONG. REC. 1185 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jeffers). See also 65 CONG. REC. 
644–46 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statements of Reps. Jones and Frear); 65 CONG. REC. 744 (Jan. 9, 1924) 
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On January 5 Senator Kenneth McKellar (D-TN) read into the 
Congressional Record one of the many pro-reduction/anti-bonus letters he 
and other congressmen had received. He noted that the letter, written by 
Pierre S. du Pont, head of E.I. du Pont de Nemours Company and General 
Motors Corporation, shed a “very interesting” light on the views of the rich 
about both the bonus and taxation.63 Like other statements on the issue, du 
Pont’s letter mixed economic and moral issues. After stating that high taxes 
discourage productive investment and encourage wasteful spending, du 
Pont then turned to the bonus, a topic “linked closely” to taxes.64 Although 
he supported those who had “just claim[s]”—that is, those injured in the 
war—he opposed using the “national income” to pay additional 
compensation to the uninjured.65 These able-bodied veterans did not need 
special attention because: 
By fortune these men are the most favored of our citizens. They have youth, 
health, strength, opportunity, and, having served in one war, are practically 
secure against further call. Since the war these men have all had opportunity 
to find employment at almost the highest wage ever known, in purchasing 
power perhaps the highest.66 
Moreover, he continued, their “lot” was far superior to that of orphans, 
women who lost jobs to returning men, the elderly poor, and “women who, 
having served the Nation in the highest degree through their motherhood, 
are left with their children unsupported through the death of their 
breadwinner.”67 Finally, du Pont wrote, even if it were true that the bonus 
was merely to show gratitude, “[it] would . . . be pitifully insincere to 
tender to these defenders of the Nation a purse, not made up by the whole 
Nation but voted by a majority out of the pockets of a defenseless 
minority.”68 (Presumably, he meant the rich, who were the small minority 
that actually paid income taxes.) 
Senator McKellar replied scathingly to du Pont. Du Pont, he charged, 
displayed “unequaled selfishness” because he 
profited probably as much as any one man in the United States by the war, and 
having secured your profits are now so ungenerous as to begrudge the 
payment of a just tax for the purpose of paying war debts, including a 
readjustment of pay so honestly due to the splendid soldiers that preserved 
 
(statement of Sen. Ashurst); 65 CONG. REC. 1185 (Jan. 21, 1924) (statement of Sen. Copeland); 
65 CONG. REC. 4373 (Mar. 17, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jeffers). 
63 65 CONG. REC. 1382 (Jan. 24, 1924) (statement of Sen. McKellar). 
64 Id. at 1383. 
65 Id. at 1382–83. 
66 Id. at 1383. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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your country and ours, your property and ours, and perhaps your life and 
ours.69 
In this regard, McKellar was in line with other critics who also pointed 
out the hypocrisy of wealthy taxpayers who benefited from the war and 
would benefit from tax reductions but opposed a soldiers’ bonus. This same 
accusation was frequently thrown at Mellon. Representative Frear, for 
example, commented that Mellon probably made more than $15,000–
$20,000 every day during the war: 
Why, then, begrudge $1.25 a day bonus during service to the fellow who only 
got $1 a day during the war to be shot at while living among the trenches, 
mud, and vermin, or why oppose giving a dollar a day to the boy who 
perchance lost his job when we seized him bodily and sent him to war?70 
Mellon’s opposition, Frear claimed, was especially miserly since Mellon 
would receive a 50% tax cut if his plan were passed.71 Critics such as 
Senators Henry Ashurst (D-AZ) and Thaddeus Caraway (D-AR) also 
pointed out the irony of the Saturday Evening Post publishing an article, 
Cut Yourself a Piece of Cake, which, they claimed, basically said it was all 
right for profiteers to keep their gains, but soldiers should not get anything 
from the Treasury.72 
Senator McKellar stressed du Pont’s self-interest in another way. 
According to Senator McKellar, the purpose of the bonus was to “readjust” 
soldiers’ pay to compensate them for the risks they took, not to show 
gratitude to soldiers, as du Pont had asserted.73 Therefore, the soldiers’ 
bonus, Senator McKellar continued, was no different from the Dent Act, 
which had compensated businesses after the war for terminated war 
contracts. Du Pont’s two companies (and subsidiaries) received 
$20,893,818 as readjustment compensation under the Dent Act. How, 
Senator McKellar wondered, could du Pont, who received so much 
compensation from the taxpayers, be against giving it to “the boys, by 
whose risk and services you were enabled so largely to increase your 
fortune, in exactly the same way that it treated you.”74 
Others agreed with Senator McKellar. Representative Mell 
Underwood (D-OH) said, “The Mellon bill would sandbag adjusted 
compensation and untax the rich.”75 The same group of “war profiteers and 
peace profiteers who made billions in profits” during the war and were 
 
69 Id. at 1384. 
70 65 CONG. REC. 647 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear). 
71 Id. at 646. 
72 See 65 CONG. REC. 744 (Jan. 9, 1924) (statement of Sen. Ashurst); id. at 3683 (statement of Sen. 
Caraway). 
73 65 CONG. REC. 1384 (Jan. 24, 1924) (statement of Sen. McKellar). 
74 Id. 
75 65 CONG. REC. 2634 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Underwood). 
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“overjoyed” when the railroads and war contractors received hundreds of 
millions in adjusted compensation now wanted to reduce their surtaxes.76 
They, whose “great fortunes were protected by our noble boys,” would 
deny a small compensation to those “who bared their breasts to the bullets 
of the enemy and slept in the vermin-infested trenches in France.”77 
Some Republicans, like Senator George McLean (R-CT), agreed with 
this view of the bonus’s purpose. The idea being touted by bonus critics 
that patriotism would be commercialized by paying ex-soldiers an 
additional $1 per day was not true, he said.78 In earlier times when sons of 
the wealthy went into the army, it might have made sense to pay soldiers 
little or nothing.79 This was no longer the case, however: 
I see nothing but ingratitude and flagrant injustice in asking him to suffer the 
tortures of war and in addition bear a financial loss out of all proportion to that 
sustained by his shopmates who remained at home in peace and safety and had 
their wages doubled.80 
Bonus opponents responded to the charge that unlike Du Pont and other 
companies, soldiers served out of patriotic duty and—unlike the defense-
related contracts of corporations—soldiers did not have a contract with the 
government.81 Soldiers did not sign up to get a salary, nor did they contract 
for indemnity against economic loss.82 Rather, opponents alleged, soldiers 
joined out of a sense of patriotism that would be belittled should they get 
additional compensation.83 
In late January 1924, the Literary Digest conducted an expensive and 
extensive pro-Mellon/anti-bonus campaign. At a cost of almost $300,000 it 
sent out approximately 15 million letters, with attached surveys, which 
made no “adequate” mention of competing tax reduction plans.84 
Additionally, the Digest paid for full-page ads in various newspapers 





78 65 CONG. REC. 1022 (Jan. 16, 1924) (statement of Sen. McLean). 
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
81 E.g., Reports Activities in Anti-bonus Move, supra note 49. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2363 (Feb. 13, 1924) (statement of Sen. Harris); 65 CONG. REC. 1905 
(Feb. 2, 1924) (statement of Rep. Blanton (D-TX)); 65 CONG. REC. 2364 (Feb. 13, 1924) (statement of 
Sen. Swanson); 65 CONG. REC. 2535 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Sen. Harris); id. at 2589 (statement 
of Rep. Tague); 65 CONG. REC. 2803–06 (Feb. 20, 1924) (statement of Sen. Harrison (D-MS)). 
85 65 CONG. REC. 2363 (Feb. 13, 1924) (statement of Sen. Harris); 65 CONG. REC. 2535 (Feb. 16, 
1924) (statement of Sen. Harris). 
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[N]othing more nor less than an argument, very misleading and unfair, for the 
Mellon plan, together with a warning or threat that you will get no reduction 
in your income tax unless you send in at once your vote for this plan and let 
your Senators and Congressmen know you favor it.86 
The poll’s intention, critics continued, was to convince the public, 
including laborers and others who would actually benefit more from the 
other plans (not mentioned by the Digest), to support the Mellon plan as the 
only way to tax reduction.87 The letter highlighted cuts for the common 
man, but not for the wealthy. Not only did the letter leave the impression 
that tax reduction had to be done the Mellon way or no way, but it also said 
that there could be no tax reduction if there were a bonus. Consequently, as 
Representative Thomas Lilly (D-WV) asserted, a vote for the Mellon Plan 
in the Digest poll would be interpreted as a vote against a bonus.88 
Critics were so worried about the campaign’s propaganda machine that 
on January 21, Senator James Reed (D-MO) announced that the newly 
formed Senate “Special Committee on Propaganda” would investigate the 
“twin propaganda” that businesses and wealthy individuals were spreading 
about the Mellon Plan and the soldiers’ bonus.89 The anti-bonus/pro-Mellon 
Plan issues were coupled, he said, because the wealthy did not want to pay 
their proportionally larger share of taxes needed to fund a bonus.90 In 
February, Senator Claude Swanson (D-VA) requested that the Committee 
pay particular attention to the Literary Digest letter and accompanying 
poll.91 A few days later, Senator William Harris (D-GA) said he had 
requested it.92 Unfortunately, one week later, the Committee indefinitely 
postponed its activities (along with its tax investigation) because one of its 
members had been hospitalized after being hit “by a stray bullet from a 
battle between prohibition agents and bootleggers.”93 The Committee 
apparently never resumed its activities. 
The Citizens’ National Committee (sometimes called the Citizens’ 
National Committee in Support of the Mellon Tax Reduction Proposal), 
formed in mid-January 1924 as a nonpartisan organization to support the 
“scientific” Mellon Plan, did not initially seem to be the sort of 
organization to worry critics. Chaired by the war hero Major General John 
F. O’Ryan, its membership included economists and tax experts such as 
E.R.A. Seligman and Frank Taussig, as well as other nationally prominent 
figures such as Yale president James Angell, businessman Roger Babson, 
 
86 65 CONG. REC. 2363 (Feb. 13, 1924) (statement of Sen. Harris). 
87 See sources cited supra note 85. 
88 65 CONG. REC. 2590 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Tague). 
89 65 CONG. REC. 1187–88 (Jan. 21, 1924). 
90 Id. 
91 65 CONG. REC. 2364 (Feb. 13, 1924). 
92 65 CONG. REC. 2535 (Feb. 16, 1924). 
93 See Delay in Probe of Propaganda for Mellon Plan, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 23, 1924, at 8. 
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former Harvard president Dr. C.W. Eliot, financier Otto Kahn, and 
statesman Henry Stimson.94 Its biggest event was a “Tax Reduction Week” 
in April which it actively promoted, as well as tax reduction generally. 
Members spoke at lunches and on the radio; the Committee even planned 
“flashes” on movie screens to “work up enthusiasm” for tax reduction on 
behalf of the general public and to signal to Congress that the country 
supported the Mellon Plan.95 College debates were arranged; large 
advertisers mentioned Tax Reduction Week in their newspaper ads, and 
“[h]undreds” of amateur wireless operators planned to “flash their tax 
views over the country.”96 The Committee claimed that tax reduction week 
resulted in a “barrage” of letters and telegrams to Congress, with 27,000 
being mailed from Los Angeles alone.97 
Despite the apparently golden reputations of Committee members, 
some critics were concerned about the Committee’s relationship to the 
bonus issue. One source of unease was the chair himself. O’Ryan became 
chair just days after completing his work as counsel for a special Senate 
Committee investigating inefficiency at the Veterans’ Bureau.98 In that 
capacity, his function had been to help veterans. Now, Senator Joseph 
Robinson (D-AR) and others alleged he was acting against their interests 
and using information he had gained as special counsel to do so. O’Ryan, 
they argued, was trying to influence people he had first organized in his 
capacity as counsel into “a bureau of propaganda” to defeat adjusted 
compensation legislation and enact the Mellon tax reduction plan.99 
Although Robinson acknowledged that O’Ryan had not done anything 
illegal, he stated that O’Ryan’s actions were neither “ethical” nor “fair.”100 
O’Ryan, Robinson said, illustrated “a feeling widespread and growing that 
ingratitude has sown itself in the hearts of the American people and that in 
order to lighten the burden of taxation” they can disregard their duty to 
those who fought in the war.101 
 
94 See, e.g., Citizens’ Committee to Back Mellon Plan, BALT. SUN, Jan. 18, 1924, at 1; Committee 
Named to Push Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1924, at 15; O’Ryan Heads Committee to Urge Tax 
Reduction, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1924, at 1; Urges Harder Tax Fight, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 1924, 
at 16. 
95 Open Week’s Drive for Tax Reduction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1924, at E1. 
96 Id.; Tax Reduction Week, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 8, 1924, at 8. 
97 Tax-Cut Drive Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1924, at E1. See also Tax Reduction Week 
Arranged, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1924, at 2; Tax Reduction Week, supra note 96. 
98 See O’Ryan Ends Senate Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1924, at 2; Veteran Assails O’Ryan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1924, at 2 (N.Y. state American Legion criticizing O’Ryan because he received $25,000 
as counsel for an investigation that “was practically a failure so far as relief for the disabled was 
concerned” and now supported the Mellon tax plan but opposed the bonus). 
99 65 CONG. REC. 2766 (Feb. 19, 1924) (statement of Sen. Robinson). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 2765–66. 
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Others attacked the funding of the Citizens’ National Committee. In 
March 1924, for example, Representative Lamar Jeffers charged that some 
of the vast amount of money with which businesses—“Mellon interests”—
were funding the “two-ply” anti-bonus/pro-Mellon campaigns went to the 
Committee.102 Claiming that one of the Committee’s purposes was to tie the 
two issues together, he quoted from an affidavit by Edward L. Allen, a 
founder and former executive director of the Anti-Bonus League.103 Allen, 
who resigned from the League in late January in protest of its methods, 
claimed that it had helped form the Citizens’ National Tax Reduction 
Committee in order to kill the bonus bill.104 Moreover, he alleged that a 
slush fund existed to both fight the bonus and to further the work of the 
Committee. Allen also maintained that a Mr. Bronson Batchelor, the “man 
and propagandist for the Anti-Bonus League,” had secured O’Ryan as the 
Committee’s chair.105 
For the rest of the spring, the pro-Mellon/anti-bonus campaigns 
continued apace, with the Senate receiving both bills at approximately the 
same time.106 Congress passed the bonus bill first, in May 1924.107 When 
President Coolidge vetoed it, administration officials hinted that he might 
have to veto the revenue bill, too, if Congress re-passed the bonus bill.108 
Although Congress overrode his veto in order to enact the Adjusted 
Compensation Act, President Coolidge did not veto the Revenue Act of 
1924, which Congress passed in June.109 Neither law, however, gave 
supporters all they desired. The vast majority of veterans received only a 
certificate redeemable in 1945 rather than immediate cash, and the Revenue 
Act of 1924 did not lower taxes enough to satisfy tax reduction 
proponents.110 The battle for both continued. 
II. 1930S NATIONAL ECONOMY LEAGUE ANTI-BONUS CAMPAIGN 
The issue of soldiers’ bonuses heated up again in 1932. By that year, 
bread riots and protests were occurring throughout the country, including 
the deadly Ford Hunger March by unemployed workers at the River Rouge 
 
102 65 CONG. REC. 4373–75 (Mar. 17, 1924). 
103 Id. at 4374–75. 
104 Id. at 4375. 
105 Id. at 4374–75; see Oliver McKee Jr., Lobbying for Good or Evil, 227 N. AM. REV. 343 (1929); 
Quinn Says People Favor the Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1924, at 8. 
106 Senate Gets Bonus and Tax Cut Bills at the Same Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1924, at 1. 
107 House Adopts Bonus Bill by Viva Voce Vote; Sends It to Coolidge, Expecting a Veto, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 1924, at 17. 
108 Prospect in Senate for Veto Is Called a “Hopeful Chance,” WASH. POST, May 19, 1924, at 3. 
109 Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253. 
110 The World War Adjusted Compensation Act, 43 Stat. 121 (1924), credited each veteran who 
served in the war between April 5, 1917, and July 1, 1919, $1 per day for each day served ($1.25 for 
each day abroad). Id. § 201. Those entitled to $50 or less received payment immediately. Id. § 301. 
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Michigan Ford plant in March 1932.111 Many World War I veterans were 
also feeling the economic pinch of the Depression and wanted Congress to 
immediately redeem the certificates they had received in 1924. In early 
1932, a veteran named Walter Waters began organizing a veterans’ march 
to Washington.112 By May, this “bonus expeditionary force” was on the 
move and Congress was reconsidering the bonus issue.113 
On May 4, at the same time that veterans were marching, the newly 
formed National Economy Committee sent Congress and President Hoover 
a petition demanding that the federal government cut approximately $450 
million of the $1 billion it spent on veterans by eliminating payments to 
veterans who had no war-related injuries and therefore were not “morally 
entitled to such relief.”114 Although the Committee stressed that this was 
not an attack on the bonus then being advocated, it also stated that they 
opposed the bonus.115 Signed by numerous military veterans after a meeting 
at the Harvard Club, the petition claimed that “the subservience of our 
government authorities to the minority group receiving this subsidy” 
severely impaired efforts to reduce the federal deficit, stabilize the dollar, 
and restore a sense of confidence in the federal government.116 The noted 
journalist Walter Lippmann called the petition “by all odds the most 
impressive move yet made toward a real reduction in Federal 
expenditure.”117 The Committee announced plans to attend both the 
Democratic and Republican nominating conventions that summer to 
persuade them to adopt a plank against benefits to veterans without war-
related injuries.118 
July 1932 was a momentous time in the history of the bonus. At the 
end of the month, the U.S. army, led by General Douglas MacArthur and 
under orders from President Hoover, forcibly evicted the marchers from the 
Washington campsite they had occupied over the summer.119 Meanwhile, 
business groups such as the United States Chamber of Commerce launched 
new campaigns to reduce government spending and taxation.120 At the same 
time, the National Economy Committee announced the formation of a 
 
111 DICKSON & ALLEN, supra note 7, at 52–53; 4 Die, Many Hurt in Jobless Clash at Ford Factory, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1932, at 1. 
112 See Bonus Army’s Commander Is a ‘Natural Born’ Leader, WASH. POST, June 9, 1932, at 3. 
113 Row in Capital over Marchers, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, May 31, 1932, at 3. 




117 Walter Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow: A Standard Is Raised, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6, 
1932, at 26. 
118 Plank Writers Invade Chicago, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, June 5, 1932, at A19. 
119 E.g., J.F. Essary, Move to Block New Siege Seen as Hoover Aim, BALT. SUN, July 31, 1932, 
at 2. 
120 New Economy Drive by Commerce Body, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1932, at 5. 
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permanent national organization, the National Economy League.121 At its 
first meeting, the League declared a broad purpose: to restore “the 
American principle that government shall be ‘for the benefit of the whole 
people.’”122 The League aimed to reduce “all wasteful and unnecessary 
governmental expenditures, which have risen to the point where they 
threaten the public credit and sap the resources of the people—and thus to 
compel the reduction of the taxes which these rising expenditures 
ultimately exact from all the people.”123 
Major newspapers covered the League’s formation, including a long 
front-page article in the New York Times. The coverage continued, 
partially—as that article wrote—because of the timeliness of the issue, but 
undoubtedly also because of the prominence of the League’s members. 
President Hoover and then-New York Governor Franklin Roosevelt 
endorsed its formation.124 Many notables had signed the Committee’s 
original petition in May, including Archibald Roosevelt, son of former 
President Theodore Roosevelt and a founder of the group; John W. Davis, 
1924 Democratic presidential candidate and founder of the law firm Davis, 
Polk, and Wardwell; and Colonel D.W. MacCormack, Commissioner of 
Immigration.125 Successful businessmen, such as former RCA president 
Major General James G. Harbord, were involved with the League, and 
some—like Marshall Field and John D. Rockefeller—contributed $1000 or 
more to the organization.126 Henry Curran, the League’s director from 
1932–1936, had previously been director of the Association Against the 
Prohibition Amendment, which was instrumental in achieving the repeal of 
the Eighteenth Amendment in December 1933; he later served as deputy 
mayor and chief magistrate of New York City.127 The League’s national 
advisory board included more notables, such as Calvin Coolidge, Alfred E. 
Smith, Elihu Root, Newton D. Baker, and General John Pershing.128 
Organizers solicited other prominent individuals and launched major 
 
121 See Crusade Planned on Veterans’ Cost, WASH. POST, July 26, 1932 at 3; Leaders in Nation 
Organize Campaign for Public Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1932, at 1; New Economy Group to 
Organize Today, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1932, at 17. 
122 Leaders in Nation Organize Campaign for Public Economy, supra note 121. 
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enrollment campaigns, including on college campuses such as Harvard.129 
Within months, at least two other anti-bonus groups merged with the 
League.130 
The late July election of Rear Admiral Richard Byrd as chair of the 
newly expanded National Economy League also helped assure continued 
press coverage. He stated that he delayed his next polar expedition in order 
to accept the position because he believed, as had Mellon in 1923, that 
taxation was the biggest issue facing the nation.131 Whatever the causes of 
the Depression, he said in his acceptance speech, it is “our inordinate 
taxation more than anything else that keeps it chronic.”132 Every single 
person bore this tax burden, he stated, because there were not enough rich 
people to pay all the taxes needed.133 Everybody paid taxes, even wage 
earners who did not pay income taxes but paid indirectly through higher 
prices and lower wages. 
The League’s first project was the elimination of wasteful spending on 
veterans.134 This campaign illustrated conservatives’ interrelation of taxing, 
spending, and form of government. In so doing, it echoed Mellon’s 1920s 
arguments that from an economic standpoint, the country could not have 
both tax reduction and soldiers’ bonuses.135 The League’s patriotic 
arguments also mirrored those of the 1920s. In a September League-
sponsored radio address, Major General O’Ryan, the Citizens National 
Committee chair in the mid-20s, not only argued that payment of an 
immediate cash bonus was unfair to people already heavily burdened with 
taxes, but he also used the same moral and patriotic appeals against the 
bonus used in the 1920s.136 The bonus was unjustified because it changed 
the concept of patriotism. Yes, he said, the bonus caused financial 
instability, but “[a]bove all, let it be made clear that honorable service in 
war at the call of country is more precious than gold . . . [and] should not 
be sullied. It should not be bartered.”137 
In November 1932, following the presidential election, National 
Economy League Chair Byrd said “[u]nfair” taxation confiscated property, 
 
129 See, e.g., Economy League Holds Drive for Enrollment, HARV. CRIMSON, Oct. 24, 1932, 
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and taxes at all levels of government must be cut.138 As in July, Byrd noted 
the heavy burden of paying for government fell on the common man, who 
was often unaware that he was paying these taxes because they were 
hidden in the price of goods and services they bought (such as bread or 
electricity).139 He reiterated this again in a December radio speech in which 
he stated that every person who heard or read his speech paid “at least three 
months of labor” per year in hidden taxes that could tax people to 
“destruction.”140 Conservatives would stress this theme of hidden taxes later 
in the 1930s, especially in the 1936 election campaign, when hidden taxes 
were a major issue in the Republican effort to defeat Roosevelt.141 
Other League supporters argued that a cash bonus and other 
extravagant veterans’ benefits were not only wasteful but harmed American 
democracy because of the process that created them. These programs, the 
League argued, were the result of an organized minority that pressured 
Congress through strategic lobbying to enact legislation that only benefited 
special interests. Thus, the League “unequivocally” opposed an immediate 
cash bonus for veterans not just because it placed “an intolerable financial 
burden” on the country, or because it was a demand “without fair basis or 
merit,” but because its passage would be caving in “to the dictation of an 
organized minority.”142 “All our American principles are opposed to it. 
There is no moral justification for it.”143 These “laws for the special few” 
cost $15 billion, which must be paid for by everyone: “For the first time 
since 1776 there is need for a second declaration of independence to break 
the servitude to organized minorities of the great majority of our people.”144 
Ironically, the only way to fight this was for “the great majority also to 
organize, for masses of people cannot act in unison without organizing.”145 
Special interest lobbying, of which Byrd and other League supporters 
spoke, was an important issue of the day. Both academics and politicians 
were worried about it. Congress had already investigated the issue several 
times, including the 1929 Senate Judiciary Lobby Investigation chaired by 
Caraway, who in the mid-1920s had spoken out about the Mellon/bonus 
lobbying.146 President Hoover’s letter supporting the League on its 
formation had also expressed concern about lobbying. The country, he 
wrote, needed a national nonpartisan organization like the League to help 
 
138 Byrd Says Tax Load Is Enslaving Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1932, at 20. 
139 Id.; see supra note 133. 
140 Byrd Welcomed Home by 500 at Economy League Reception, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1932, 
at 4. 
141 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Remembering the ‘Forgotten Man’ (and Woman): Hidden Taxes and 
the 1936 Election, in 4 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW 327, 327–40 (John Tiley ed., 2010). 
142 Fights Surrender to Bonus ‘Minority,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1932, at 2. 
143 Id. 
144 Bonus Payment Plan Denounced by Byrd, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 4, 1932, at 2. 
145 Id. 
146 See S. REP. NO. 71-43, at 1–3 (1929). 
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Congress “defend” against the constant pressure of lobbyists to increase 
governmental spending and trim expenditures.147 
The League’s view that an organized minority was lobbying Congress 
to support the bonus had some truth to it, but as the well-organized, pro-
bonus American Legion and others quickly pointed out, the National 
Economy League was also an organized minority engaged in lobbying. In 
fact, at a joint House and Senate hearing on veteran affairs during 
December 1932–January 1933, League critics claimed the League violated 
the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which required political organizations to 
submit their contributions and expenses to the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives.148 The Act, Representative Wright Patman (D-TX) said, 
defined a “political” committee as one that accepts contributions and/or 
makes expenditures “for the purpose of influencing or attempting to 
influence the election of a candidate” for Congress or President.149 Yet, 
Patman continued, the League filed no reports even though it was spending 
large amounts of money to do just that.150 He quoted statements made by 
the League prior to the November 1932 election, such as one by the League 
organizer Archibald Roosevelt: “When any Congressman votes against 
something of sound economy, we expect to have the local chief of the 
National Economy League in his district know about it and raise hell if he 
can.”151 
Representative Patman then elaborated on the political aspect of the 
League. For example, the League was organized according to congressional 
districts and members were asked to state the congressional district in 
which they lived.152 Although some Representatives agreed that the League 
violated the Act, others, such as Representative Joseph Hooper (R-MI), 
said the League should not be singled out; other organizations should also 
be investigated for violations.153 
League Director Henry Curran admitted that the League had not filed 
any report but claimed that such failure did not violate the Corrupt 
Practices Act because the League did not lobby.154 Its purpose, he said, was 
to be “a bureau of information” to provide facts and arguments to the 
American people; it was the people themselves, using those facts, who will 
 
147 Letter from Herbert Hoover, U.S. President, to Grenville Clark, Chairman, Org. Comm., Nat’l 
Econ. League (July 22, 1932), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23183. 
148 Veterans’ Affairs: Hearings Before the J. Cong. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, Vol. 2, 72nd 
Cong. 511–13, 529–30 (1933) [hereinafter Hearings]; 76 CONG. REC. 1232–33 (Jan. 3, 1933); Law 
Violation Laid to Economy League, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1932, at 10. 
149 76 CONG. REC. 1232 (Jan. 3, 1933). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1231–32 (statement of Rep. Patman). See Plans National Fight on Veterans’ ‘Racket,’ 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1932, at 2. 
153 76 CONG. REC. 1237 (Jan. 3, 1933). 
154 Hearings, supra note 148, at 512–13. 
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act to influence legislation in Congress, not the League.155 Newspapers did 
not file reports even though they distributed facts and arguments, he noted, 
and neither should the League.156 
At the hearing, League critics made two other charges—both of which 
had been made against bonus supporters in the 1920s. First, they claimed 
that many of the League’s leading members were “inconsistent.”157 
Members such as Byrd, General Pershing, and Major General James 
Harbord wanted to eliminate pensions for injured veterans even though 
they themselves were receiving large retirement pensions from the federal 
government.158 Other members, critics noted, received different government 
subsidies. Representative Patman observed, for example, that League 
founder Archibald Roosevelt’s company provided ocean mail steamship 
service for the post office.159 
Harbord resigned in early 1933, shortly after these charges appeared, 
and later stated that he thought the purpose of the League was to 
recommend cuts in all branches of government and its focus on veterans’ 
benefits had become “very embarrassing to me as a retired Army 
officer.”160 In April, Byrd resigned as League chair, but he remained on the 
executive committee.161 His stated reason for resigning was his need to 
attend to his personal affairs;162 one wonders, however, whether all the 
negative publicity about his receipts from the government while he urged 
the elimination of some veterans’ benefits played a role in his decision. 
The second charge made at the joint hearings was that the League 
represented, and was funded primarily by, businesses and wealthy 
taxpayers in order to lessen their own tax burdens. This was a long-
standing accusation. Indeed, days after the League’s formation, 
Representative William Connery Jr. (D-MA) had called the League the 
“new-born favorite child of big business” and of large income taxpayers 
who see “no percentage of profit in [the bonus] for the Wall Street 
interests.”163 The fact that many large, pro-business newspapers endorsed 
the League lent some weight to this allegation.164 
 
155 Id. at 512. 
156 Id. at 513. 
157 See id. at 131; 76 CONG. REC. 1156 (Jan. 3, 1933) (statement of Sen. Robinson). 
158 76 CONG. REC. 1232 (Jan. 3, 1933); Hearings, supra note 148, at 131. 
159 76 CONG. REC. 1232 (Jan. 3, 1933). 
160 77 CONG. REC. 178 (Mar. 11, 1933). 
161 Byrd Resigns as Chairman of Economy League, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 26, 1933, at 7. 
162 Id. 
163 Calls Economy League Big Business Child, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1932, at 2. 
164 National Economy League Purposes Heartily Endorsed by World-Telegram, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Dec. 5, 1932, at 2. 
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Representative Patman also had charged that the Mellon and Morgan 
“group” had helped fund the League.165 At the January hearings, Curran 
provided information that supported these charges. The list of contributors 
he provided showed that by the end of 1932, about six months after its 
founding, the League had received approximately $200,000 in 
contributions from 25,000 individuals, with an average contribution of 
$8.166 Seventeen individuals, however, had given $1000 or more, with the 
sum total of those contributions ($35,100) comprising slightly more than 
17% of the total.167 The list of names included wealthy industrialists, 
bankers (including names of Morgan-connected individuals), and others 
whose names are still recognizable today, such as Marshall Field and John 
D. Rockefeller, Jr.168 
Wealthy individuals and groups certainly contributed to the League. In 
fact, the League had greater support in states that paid the most in income 
taxes, such as Massachusetts.169 Moreover, as Representative Charles 
Gifford (R-MA) pointed out, there was an inverse relationship between the 
(implicitly shiftless) tax-eating individuals on benefits and taxpayers: there 
were fewer veterans on government benefits in these higher paying states 
than in states like Mississippi that contributed little to federal revenues.170 
Some League critics charged that the League’s real purpose was not 
government economy but reducing taxes on “large income taxpayers.”171 
These critics noted that if the federal government stopped paying veterans’ 
benefits, state and local governments would be the sole providers of the 
benefits.172 Since these governments were funded primarily by property 
taxes, the tax burden would shift to already overburdened average citizens. 
In contrast, using federal funds to pay veterans’ benefits comported with 
the ability-to-pay doctrine, because these funds were derived largely from 
income and estate taxes paid by the wealthy. 
In March 1933, Congress passed the Economy Act of 1933, which 
among other things, reduced payments to veterans.173 Accordingly, on 
April  1, 1933, President Roosevelt signed an executive order that cut 
approximately $400 million per year from the federal budget partially by 
eliminating disability pensions to veterans whose injuries were not war 
 
165 Economy League Broke Law, Patman Charges, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1932, at 4. Cf. Law 
Violation Laid to Economy League, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1932, at 10 (reporting that Rep. Patman wrote 
a letter alleging that the League had violated the Federal Corrupt Practices Act). 
166 Hearings, supra note 148, at 508–10. 
167 Id. 
168 77 CONG. REC. 274 (Mar. 13, 1933) (statement of Sen. Long, inserting lists of supporters). 
169 See 76 CONG. REC. 1237–38 (Jan. 3, 1933) (statement of Rep. Gifford). 
170 Id.; 77 CONG. REC. 274 (Mar. 13, 1933) (statement of Sen. Long). 
171 76 CONG. REC. 1156 (Jan. 3, 1933) (statement of Sen. Robinson). See also id. at 1235–36 
(statement of Rep. Kvale). 
172 See supra note 171. 
173 See Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 8. 
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related.174 Veterans responded with a second, smaller bonus march on 
Washington. Roosevelt avoided Hoover’s forced eviction and attempted to 
deflect the marchers by offering them jobs in the Citizens’ Conservation 
Corps (CCC).175 
This offer did not entirely placate veterans, and the battle over 
veterans’ benefits persisted. The League, still in its anti-bonus leadership 
position, continued opposing the benefits not just on economic grounds but 
also because benefits to able-bodied veterans were “in clear defiance of 
principle and self-respect.”176 Bonus proponents once again continued to 
highlight the hypocrisy of the League’s attack because, as Representative 
Patman charged, some League members “have received more from the 
Federal government than any disabled veteran. These favors, through the 
Federal Reserve printing of their bank notes at ridiculously low prices, 
income tax refunds and war contract settlements made the money given to 
veterans seem absurdly small.”177 
While bonus proponents continued to allege that the League and other 
bonus opponents engaged in unfair lobbying by using “the daily press, the 
radio and the screen and stage to disseminate their subversive 
propaganda,”178 the League argued that bonus proponents unfairly pressed 
their views. In April 1934, for example, League Director Henry Curran sent 
Senators a letter asserting that the veterans lobby threatened to defeat the 
reelection of any Senator opposing the then-current House bill for an 
immediate cash payment—the exact opposite of the political threats bonus 
supporters claimed bonus opponents made.179 In actuality, lobbying about 
the bonus was so heated on both sides that there were (unsuccessful) calls 
for an investigation of all veterans’ organizations in 1934.180 In 1936, there 
were also calls for the ongoing Senate Lobbying Investigation Committee 
to investigate the League,181 but it never did. 
The bonus bill battle continued throughout 1934 and 1935. After 
debating various bills during the spring of 1935, Congress finally passed 
one in May, but President Roosevelt vetoed it for reasons familiar to 
 
174 Thousands Lose All Pay: Veterans Put Number at 406,000, While 29,000 Will Get But $20, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1933, at 1. 
175 See Bonus Group’s Leader Favors Jobs in Forest, WASH. POST, May 19, 1933, at 1; Roosevelt 
Blocks Paying Cash Bonus; Aids Idle Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1933, at 1. 
176 Veterans’ Aid Cost Declared Too High, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1934, at 2. See also Roosevelt 
Warned Our Debt Will Rise 4 Billion in Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1933, at 1 (noting that the League 
was a leader of the 1933 fight against veterans’ benefits). 
177 Economy League Hit by Patman, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1934, at 9. 
178 Id.; Press Challenged by Legion Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1934, at 17 (claiming the League 
was the nation’s “greatest lobbyist”). 
179 See Veterans’ Lobby Warning Given, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1934, at 5. 
180 See Fight on Legion Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1934, at 13. 
181 See Arthur Sears Henning, Terror Spread Among Enemies by New Dealers, CHI. DAILY TRIB., 
Feb. 9, 1936, at 1. 
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conservatives.182 From an economic standpoint, he stated, the boost in 
spending power veterans received would not have lasting effects for 
recovery.183 This was especially true because the bill’s inflationary 
effects—since it provided for no new taxes to fund the payment—would 
more than cancel out any positive effects. Even without such results, 
Roosevelt claimed he opposed the bill because it went against American 
principles of not allowing “political coercion by minorities.”184 Not 
surprisingly, the League praised Roosevelt, claiming the veto was “good 
insurance against bad inflation.”185 
Part of Roosevelt’s opposition to the bonus undoubtedly stemmed 
from his own, different, political priorities. He wanted tax revenues to fund 
programs designed to aid economic recovery and cushion the effects of the 
Depression. His recommendations to Congress the next month for higher 
taxes on large incomes and inheritances demonstrated his willingness to 
enact, at least symbolically, “soak-the-rich” legislation to do so—or so his 
critics charged.186 
In January 1936, Congress passed yet another bonus bill which 
Roosevelt vetoed yet again for the same reasons.187 However, greater tax 
issues may have played a role in his decision to veto the bill a second time: 
just weeks earlier, the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler had 
punched a multi-million dollar hole in federal revenues by invalidating the 
processing tax in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.188 Within days 
(hours in the House), Congress overrode the veto and replaced the 1924 
bonus certificates with interest-bearing Treasury bonds that could be 
redeemed as early as June 15, 1936189—accelerating the veterans’ bonus by 
almost a decade. Once the bonus issue was resolved, the League continued 
its push for thriftiness in government, but press coverage declined, and by 
1943, the League basically disappeared from the public eye. 
Conservatives generally, however, continued to link the broader issues 
of taxing, spending, and the nature of American democracy. Indeed, some 
prominent League participants were active in other conservative grassroots 
 
182 See H.R. DOC. NO. 74-197, at 1 (1935). 
183 Id. at 4. 
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organizations, such as the American Liberty League. These groups also 
draped their arguments in the American flag and used modern media and 
marketing techniques in their attempts to sway legislators and the public to 
defeat Roosevelt and his tax-and-spend “socialist” agenda.190 
III. THEN AND NOW 
Conservative tax policy still rests on the same three arguments that 
conservative pro-tax reduction/anti-bonus campaigns used in the 1920s and 
1930s. The first argument is an economic one designed to appeal to the 
“common” (i.e., middle class) voter. It asserts that reducing taxes on the 
wealthy benefits everyone in two ways. Lower taxes are economically 
efficient because they increase investments, the benefits of which “trickle 
down” to the masses by expanding jobs, increasing wages, and lowering 
prices.191 Lower taxation, they also state, is economically efficient because 
it curbs wasteful government spending, which also depresses economic 
growth.192 
Conservatives also continue to articulate, as the National Economy 
League did so succinctly in its 1934 letter to Congress, the connection 
between taxing and spending: “Will you take this [money for the bonus] 
out of us in taxes all at once or try to borrow it from somebody else, or run 
it off the printing presses in inflated money?”193 Although conservatives do 
a public service today by continuing to highlight the connection between 
taxing and spending, their economic rationales and conclusions are 
inextricably intertwined with political ideology. Not only do recent 
statistics on increased wealth and income disparity show the limits of 
“trickle-down” theory,194 but also all government spending is not wasteful. 
 
190 See, e.g., GEORGE WOLFSKILL, THE REVOLT OF THE CONSERVATIVES 65–72 (1962) (detailing 
the American Liberty League’s methods to achieve their agenda). See generally Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (2010); Kornhauser, 
supra note 141. 
191 See supra note 1. 
192 See Takala, supra note 1. 
193 Compare Congress Urged to Resist Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1934, at 4, and Van Zandt Hits 
U.S. Chamber, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, May 5, 1935, at A34, with REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, 2008 
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 15 (2008), http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2008plat
form.pdf (“Republicans will uphold and defend our party’s core principles: Constrain the federal 
government to its legitimate constitutional functions. Unleash the power of enterprise, innovation, civic 
energy, and the American spirit—and never pretend that government is a substitute for family or 
community.”), and Bruce Bartlett, Norquist Holds the Deficit Hostage to ‘Starve the Beast’ Theory, 
130 TAX NOTES 1491 (2011). 
194 See CHAD STONE ET AL., A GUIDE TO STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME 
INEQUALITY 1 (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/11-28-11pov.pdf; Anthony B. Atkinson et 
al., Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 5 (2011) (noting that “the 
increase in top income shares in recent decades has been quite concentrated with most of the gains 
accruing to the top percentile”). 
108:825 (2014) Conservative Tax Policy 
851 
Many believe that properly devised spending on infrastructure, especially 
early childhood education for example, can stimulate economic growth.195 
Conservatives often display curious blind spots about government 
spending. For instance, their examples of excessive spending usually focus 
on “entitlement” benefits for large masses of people—veterans’ benefits, 
social security, and healthcare.196 Conservatives often tend to ignore, 
however, the large amount of government spending that benefits the 
wealthy. This spending can be through the tax system by means of tax 
preferences (or loopholes, depending on one’s viewpoint) for wealthy 
individuals and corporations. The spending also can be via direct 
expenditures. Recently, conservatives in Congress voted to cut back food 
stamps while at the same time continue agricultural subsidies that go 
largely to the wealthy.197 Direct spending that benefits the wealthy also 
frequently occurs in the context of defense (a part of the budget 
conservatives generally do not want to cut). Although President 
Eisenhower warned against the wealth and power accruing to the “military-
industrial complex” in his 1961 farewell address,198 bonus supporters in the 
1920s and 1930s had already noted these dangers and commented on the 
sizeable military pensions and defense contracts wealthy anti-bonus 
individuals and corporations received. Today, the country’s current huge 
national defense budget, increasing tax expenditures, and privatization of 
many functions continue—if not enlarge—the concentration of such 
material benefits and power. A recent report found that not only is the 
federal government spending more on service contractors than on federal 
employees, but that the cost of those contractors on average is almost twice 
that it would be if federal employees performed the services.199 
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The second conservative argument, then and now, is a legal and 
constitutional one: heavy taxing and spending destroy fundamental aspects 
of American democracy. High taxes support an enlarged government 
whose programs sometimes violate Tenth Amendment limitations on the 
federal government. Moreover, the high taxation needed to fund such 
spending restricts individual freedom and may even be considered an 
illegal confiscation of property, as Byrd alleged in 1932.200 President 
Reagan, for example, when proposing his tax reduction plan in 1985, said: 
I believe that in both spirit and substance our tax system has come to be un-
American. . . . The first American Revolution was sparked by an unshakable 
conviction: Taxation without representation is tyranny. Two centuries later a 
second American Revolution for hope and opportunity is gathering force 
again, a peaceful revolution but born of popular resentment against a tax 
system that is unwise, unwanted and unfair.201 
Others have gone even further. Herman Cain, campaigning for the 
Republican 2012 presidential nomination, for example, called the tax code 
a “21st-century version of slavery.”202 Conservatives also argue that income 
taxes, especially if progressive, can easily become a tyranny of the majority 
in which the low (or no) tax majority shift the burden of taxation to a 
minority—the rich.203 
The conservative constitutional argument, coupled with a moral 
component in its economic argument, easily—and consistently—merges 
into a patriotic argument. Moral appeals contrast the growth-creating 
entrepreneur (the taxpayer) with the lazy, benefit-seeking tax eater who 
saps economic vitality from the nation by relying on the government for 
food, housing, and medical care. This morally inferior tax taker also 
undermines the American character and ultimately the American way of 
life. The tax eater lacks independence, self-reliance, and the entrepreneurial 
spirit. These traits are not only the ones by which Americans define 
themselves, but the ones that stereotypically lie at the heart of American 
progress and exceptionalism. Mitt Romney’s (in)famous comment during 
the 2012 presidential campaign characterizing the 47% of Americans who 
pay no taxes as freeloaders who were “dependent upon government” 
exemplifies this.204 Although his comments were meant to be private, they 
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echo modern public rhetoric about dependent welfare queens. They also 
echo earlier claims that a bonus to able-bodied veterans was not only 
wasteful spending but also went against American traits of self-respect and 
independence.205 
Despite the existence of alternative notions of economics, patriotism, 
and democracy, conservatives have successfully wedded their conceptions, 
especially of patriotism, to low taxation. Perhaps the most prominent 
example of this is their appropriation of the American Revolution, as 
illustrated by President Reagan’s comments in 1985. Back in the 1930s, 
Admiral Byrd of the National Economy League stated that “citizens must 
develop the same spirit our forefathers had in the days of the Boston tea 
party” to save the country from the “crushing” burden of taxation.206 In 
modern times, actual reenactments of the Boston Tea Party and the 
formation of a political movement called the Tea Party have used its potent 
symbolism to link low or no taxation to the essence of American 
democracy. In short, whether “mainstream” Republicans or “tea partiers,” 
conservatives have by and large “captured” patriotism and use it to promote 
their tax positions.207 
Conservatives have accomplished this feat through adroitly using 
rhetoric and media to influence the public. Politicians, of course, have 
always used these tools to sell their agenda to the masses. However, the 
origins of the methods and means used today reached their first fruition 
during the period of the anti-bonus/pro-reduction campaigns. It was then 
that professionals expanded new knowledge about persuasion gained 
through government efforts to encourage support for World War I. Post 
war, research continued to rapidly expand in fields such as psychology, 
statistics, and marketing; professionals quickly used the newly gained 
knowledge in the political sphere to sell candidates and policies, just as 
they applied them to sell toothpaste in the commercial sphere.208 In that 
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same period, technology created and expanded new mass media—most 
notably the radio, which gave professionals and politicians easy access to 
millions of people. 
Both liberals and conservatives, of course, used this knowledge and 
technology. President Roosevelt’s popular fireside chats may be the best 
example of Democratic usage during this period. Republicans, however, 
generally caught on more quickly. For example, the 1920 Republican 
presidential campaign, under the guidance of advertising pioneer Albert D. 
Lasker, was the first modern media-driven sell-the-candidate campaign.209 
In 1928, when the radio came of political age, the Republicans dedicated a 
significant amount of their funds to the radio, as well as using film in their 
campaigns.210 In 1936, the Republicans turned the entire campaign over to 
the professionals—publicity agents, journalists, and advertising experts—to 
use modern advertising techniques, propaganda, and the media in an 
attempt to “sell” Alf Landon, just as they would sell any product.211 
Conservative groups in this period also used the same modern methods to 
oppose Roosevelt and the New Deal.212 
The 21st century is a similar period of rapid growth in new methods of 
mass communication and in new knowledge about human behavior (e.g., 
behavioral economics, behavioral psychology, and cognitive theory 
generally). Both conservatives and liberals have made effective use of this 
knowledge and media. Conservatives even complain about the liberal 
media bias. Nevertheless, as the success of Fox News, Rush Limbaugh, and 
the Tea Party movement indicate, conservatives have been remarkably 
adept at putting modern psychology and technology at their service.213 
In 1924 the Citizens’ National Committee’s tax campaign, probably 
the first modern tax lobbying campaign,214 used techniques still employed 
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today. Then, for example, there was Tax Reduction Week; now, there is 
“Tax Freedom Day,” theoretically the day in the year a person has worked 
long enough to pay all his or her taxes.215 Ninety years ago the radio and the 
movies were the media the modern media politicians and political groups 
used to convey their messages; today it is the Internet, especially social 
networks such as Twitter and Facebook. Organizations using civic-minded 
names compile and disseminate information as objective facts. In reality, 
however, the groups’ neutral sounding names often mask an ideological 
bias that goes undetected. Back then the organizations had names like the 
Citizens’ National Committee and the National Economy League. Today 
organizations use names such as Americans for Tax Reform.216 They 
widely disseminate their views, often disguised as news and “facts.” They 
even created “news” through “Tax Reduction Weeks” in the 1920s and tea 
party reenactments in the modern era. 
Whether these groups’ pronouncements are facts or propaganda, of 
course, depends on the definition of propaganda. Identifying propaganda, 
however, is a difficult enterprise. Like pornography, its definition 
frequently depends on the perspective of the recipient. Nevertheless, it is 
harder to differentiate propaganda from objective fact (leaving aside the 
philosophical question of whether objective facts exist) when the recipient 
does not know the source of the information. This phenomenon underlies 
much of the current uneasiness about anonymous donors and 
advertisements in the political context. This concern also existed in the 
decades between the world wars. An “organized propagandist,” 
Representative John Jones (D-TX) said in 1924, is worse than a “crack-
brained agitator[]” because the latter operates openly.217 Consequently, 
“[v]ery few are convinced by them. But the propagandist sometimes 
operates through a mask of deception.”218 
Patriotism is a frequent handmaiden of propaganda because it evokes 
emotional responses that often unconsciously influence our perceptions and 
interpretations of information and actions. Psychologists, sociologists, and 
economists explain why this is so, using concepts such as framing, 
cognitive biases, schemas, and worldviews, all of which explain how 
people perceive, filter, and organize the huge amount of data they 
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encounter daily.219 Modern research in behavioral economics and 
psychology has enhanced experts’ understanding of these concepts, which 
lawyers, politicians, marketers, and others have utilized.220 Neither the 
knowledge nor its applications is entirely new, however. While critiquing 
Mellon Plan supporters, for example, Representative Jones noted the 
deleterious effect of those emotional appeals: “Facts are prosaic things, and 
what are facts when the circus is on . . . . Reason simply stacks arms and 
leaves the field under those circumstances.”221 
Mellon Plan supporters similarly criticized their opponents. In April 
1924, for example, Major General O’Ryan, bonus opponent and chair of 
the Citizens’ National Committee in Support of the Mellon Tax Reduction 
Proposal, spoke of the need for tax and spending cuts.222 Politicians, he 
said, “befog and befuddle” issues with “clap-trap” phrases to which the 
public is “susceptible” because such appeals were easier to listen to and 
less “tiresome” than “to examine critically into a matter that concerns them 
only as it concerns the public generally.”223 The Mellon Plan, he and other 
supporters asserted, was scientific, not claptrap.224 
Whether their plan was claptrap was and is debatable, of course. What 
is not debatable is that, despite their assertions to the contrary, conservative 
anti-bonus/Mellon Plan supporters used claptrap, just as their opponents 
did. Then—as now—patriotism is conservatives’ claptrap, their circus that 
causes reason to leave the field. It is also the portion of the conservative tax 
argument that has the greatest mass appeal. 
Because they are based in emotion, patriotic appeals are susceptible to 
cognitive biases.225 In America, the linkage of low taxation with patriotism 
provides particularly rich ground for emotive, often subconscious, 
reactions. After all, schoolchildren learn that the country itself sprang from 
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a tax protest and national icons like President Reagan constantly remind us 
that heavy taxation is a constraint upon freedom.226 
It is not surprising, then, that conservatism’s linkage of low taxation to 
patriotism has been so successful. It has not been a complete victory; after 
all, the income tax still exists despite decades of conservative attempts to 
abolish it.227 The conservative patriotic tax appeal has succeeded, however, 
to the extent that Americans currently pay (despite recent increases) 
relatively low income taxes historically and lower rates compared to some 
countries.228 Indeed, many Americans pay no income taxes (though they 
probably pay social security taxes).229 
CONCLUSION 
The linkage of tax reduction to the soldiers’ bonus in the 1920s and 
1930s described in this Article illustrates conservatives’ long standing 
tripartite stand on tax policy. Although both liberals and conservatives bear 
responsibility for the chaotic state of tax and tax policy today, this Article 
asserts that conservatives bear more responsibility because they have 
conveyed their policy more successfully. This, the Article alleges, has 
occurred primarily because they have linked their conception of patriotism 
to low taxation. Unfortunately, this linkage limits the realm of politically 
possible solutions to many of today’s most pressing issues, including 
taxation. This is not just because it enables emotion to trump rationality, 
but also because the conservative vision of patriotism is incomplete. 
American democracy is not founded solely on the principle of liberty, but 
also on the principle of equality. Liberty itself has a positive side, not just a 
negative one. Conservatives emphasize the negative, “freedom from” side 
in their exaltation of individualism, small government, and low taxation. 
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The Preamble to the Constitution, however, also provides for the promotion 
of the general welfare—which involves positive liberty. Positive liberty 
means that the government has a duty not just to protect negative liberty 
but also to assist positive liberty. Positive liberty encompasses people’s 
basic human rights to such things as food, health, and education—which 
are, in fact, preconditions to negative liberty.230 
The patriotism–tax linkage also hinders debate about general issues 
such as healthcare because it obscures real understanding of—and debate 
about—conservatives’ two substantive points: the necessary connection 
between taxing and spending and the desirable size of government. It 
encourages fuzzy thinking that allows people to claim they want lower 
taxes, less government spending, and smaller government while at the same 
time insist government programs (such as Medicare or Social Security) 
remain uncut, and even demand more from the government (whether it is 
more gun control, immigration control, or food-and-drug inspections). In 
this era of huge deficits and incoherent tax policy, these two substantive 
aspects of conservatives’ tax position are the very ones that need critical 
attention. Separating them from the emotion of patriotism would help 
create an atmosphere more conducive to the thoughtful tax discussion the 
country requires. Dropping their strong patriotic appeals and focusing on 
substance would be the most patriotic action conservatives could take. 
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